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Abstract
Modifying a parallel dynamic programming approach to a simple deterministic economy, we consider the effect of an innovation in
the means of production. The success of the innovation is assumed
to depend on the availability of financing, locus of financial control,
the amount of resources invested, and on a random event. The relationship between money and physical assets is critical. In this first
part stress is laid on the innovation behavior of Robinson Crusoe in
a premonetary economy, then on his actions in a monetary economy
in partial equilibrium. Part 2 considers the closed monetary economy
with several differentiated agents
JEL Classification. C73, D24, G32
Key Words: Cost innovation, Schumpeter, circular flow, strategic
market games.
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1

Context and circular flow

The title Schumpeter and equilibrium almost appears to be an oxymoron. In
two linked, but independent, papers we construct simple models that achieve
a mathematization of a fundamental insight that Schumpeter had almost a
hundred years ago on the need to break the circular flow of finance required
in a closed economy in equilibrium when there is the possibility of innovation.
Our key concern is to be able to illustrate the relationship between real assets
and money and debt. This requires investigating the nature of the cash flows
and how the amount of money, credit, and prices change even in greatly
simplified models of innovation. Stress is laid not merely on the control of
the money and credit supply, but their relation to present and future physical
assets and (implicitly) the evaluation aspects of the financing of innovation.
This first essay concentrates on the physical resource aspects of innovation. The second addresses the financial aspects.
The remainder of Section 1 is devoted to a general discussion of some
of the issues that arise when innovation is introduced in economic models.
Section 2 is a brief discussion of the ways in which innovation can be financed.
Section 3 explains the simple technique that we use to model innovation in
the improvement of a production process. In Section 4 we study innovation
models for Robinson Crusoe acting as a single agent producing for his own
consumption without the apparatus of finance. Section 5 then treats models
in which Crusoe is viewed as a small firm or the owner-manager of a small
firm in a large market economy. The final section is a brief discussion of some
additional issues to be addressed in the second of these essays.

1.1

Equilibrium or disequilibrium

These essays are devoted to the specific task of providing some formal theory
on the financing of innovation. But the emphasis is on the formalization and
to solving some basic models to illustrate different control structures involved
in innovation.
We intend to utilize some of these models to construct experimental games
where process innovation is strategically feasible 1 . Our goal is limited to
being able to provide a simple theory and to analyze simple models of the
1

This essay is related to three others, one discursive [14] , another experimental [?].
and a third mathematical [8] but all can be read independently of the others.

3

financing of innovation that formalize the breaking of the circular flow of
capital . A related experimental game can be constructed and utilized to
obtain experimental data to contrast with the theory.
At even the simplest level there are many details to be covered and distinctions to be illustrated before we are able to show the nature of the control
system in a monetary economy with innovation. For this reason we first lay
out the problems in innovation prior to the introduction of money and the
possible separation of ownership, evaluation and control.
The success or failure of an innovation in production is here modeled as a
random event with the probability of success being a function of the amount
of real resources invested. There is a single random event in our model. If, as
Schumpeter implicitly suggested, there is a sequence of random events, the
modelling would be far more complex. Even a satisfactory definition of what
constitutes a reasonable solution is not immediately obvious. Fortunately for
the purpose of considering many of the basic problems in the financing of
innovation the single random variable model is adequate.

1.2

The evolution of control

Although our prime immediate goal is as noted above, a general comment
on the emergence of control and the increasing complexity of an innovating
or evolving economy is called for.
We begin with a study of Robinson Crusoe, who as a solitary individual
cannot use finance.2 His optimization problem has constraints imposed by
real resources and his production technology. A mass economy faces problems
in coordination far beyond those of Crusoe. The introduction of a commodity
money and markets provides a means for coordination that leaves the control
of the quantity of money to the private sector of gold and/or silver producers.
The introduction of a fiat money provides a means of exchange where much
of the control of issue is centralized into the hands of the government and a
private banking system, if it is permitted to vary the money supply.
In a mass market, Crusoe’s optimization is replaced with a similar type
of optimization but with more financial constraints imposed by money and
weaker constraints relaxed by the presence of more commodities available
in the markets. Fiat money is more relevant and realistic in the study of a
2

Although he may find accounting useful as an aide memoire, and with a stretch of the
imagination could set up a virtual market to calculate vitrual prices for himself.

4

modern economy; however the use of a commodity as money makes it easier
to study concepts such as the meaning of reserves and the quantity of money
in the system. The utilization of a commodity money without other forms
of credit imposes a well defined physical resource constraint on the economy.
This constraint can be removed by replacing the gold with generally accepted
paper. This imposes somewhat different constraints on the economy and
provides a government with considerable economic control, but saves the
deadweight loss of using an otherwise useful commodity for transactions or
reserves. In going from a real commodity money to a fiat money an extra
degree of freedom is introduced into the economy and aspects of that freedom
can be controlled by the banking system.
By fixing default rules and monetary issue rules a government can bound
the price system from below and above in an economy utilizing fiat money. In
general the price levels in a system with any uncertainty cannot be uniquely
specified 3 . Furthermore both size of issue and default penalties must change
in a growing or shrinking economy if prices are to adjust appropriately..
The system with gold is not as flexible as the system with fiat. But
the flexibility of the fiat system poses problems in the political economy of
control and evaluation. With gold both the mathematics and the physics
of the constraints on economic dynamics are well described. With fiat the
selection of constraints on the optimization becomes an exercise in political
economy. With gold government control is lessened and in particular the use
of gold considerably limits the opportunities for inflation.4

1.3

On simple well-defined models and the playable
game test.

Our approach is to construct simple but detailed models specifying every feasible move and all information conditions. Even so, with the micro-economic
detail of economic reality, they represent a gross oversimplification. We attempt to construct the simplest mechanisms for which the phenomena of
relevance appear. As they are well-defined models they should either manifest the basic properties ascribed to more realistic models or otherwise they
3
It will depend on details of initial conditions and asset structure as well as default and
issue conditions.
4
Whether inflation is good or bad for the economy is a question that is not addressed
in this essay.
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should serve to indicate why some phenomena do not appear until a higher
level of complexity is attained. The stress is on process analysis. The economy is viewed as a fully defined game of strategy.
The stress on the construction of an experimental game is made for two
basic reasons. The first is to see if we can predict behavior in these simple economic environments. The second is that when dealing with economic
dynamics it is easy to overlook apparently minor details that may have considerable influence on behavior. These include being specific about time
lags, default conditions, constraints on borrowing, terminal conditions and
other micro-economic details that can be easily overlooked without the full
specification of a process model or a playable game.

1.4

The circular flow and equilibrium

In a modern economy much of economic activity calls for the use of money
and credit, both for decentralization and control. Money, credit and financial
institutions provide the link between statics and equilibrium and dynamics
and disequilibrium.
General equilibrium deals precisely with equilibrium states. In spite of its
elegance and abstraction, as was noted by Koopmans [9], general equilibrium
theory is pre-institutional. Because the economic world is highly complex and
multivariate, radical simplification is called for in the mathematization of the
models studied. When process models of general equilibrium are mathematically formulated even the convergence to equilibrium from positions out of
equilibrium in simple dynamic models may be difficult to establish. In contrast the literature on innovation is always process oriented. There are some
simulations of these processes, but the predominant approach to understanding innovation is via the essay, often bolstered with empirical studies analyzed
statistically.
Although originally written nearly a hundred years ago, Schumpeter’s
work on The Theory of Economic Development [15] [1934, 1911] provided
an insightful description (in essay form) of a plausible dynamic process involving the interaction of the financial and physical processes of the economy
intermixed with the socio-psychological factors of optimism and pessimism.
No formal mathematical model was developed.
In the last twenty to thirty years there has been a surge in the writing
on innovation as is evinced in the works of Nelson and Winter [13], Dosi et
al. [5], Nelson [12], Lamoreaux and Sokoloff [11], Baumol [2] and many oth6

ers. Beyond these works an understanding of the analogy between economic
innovation and biological mutation is growing.

1.5

Types of innovation

The study of innovation cannot be approached monolithically. There are at
least four distinct types of
innovation, namely:
• radically new product innovation;
• engineering variation of current product;
• distribution, network, information and communication innovation;
• organization, cost reduction or other process innovation influencing efficiency.
In terms of uncertainty they are highly different. The most difficult to
handle by conventional economic analysis are radical product and network
innovations. Both the production procedures and the demand acceptance
are unknown. There often is little, if any, precedence. The subjective probabilities for success, if any, may be cooked up by stretched analogy with other
products and networks that have succeeded or failed; and only can be quantified for the purpose of the construction of imaginary or pro forma financial
statements used to persuade potential investors. They are also often subject to “winner take all increasing returns”, as suggested by the insightful
work of Arthur [1] who develops a plausible probabilistic increasing returns
to scale model where chance determines who inherits the market, and the
best technology does not necessarily emerge.
More or less standard product variation fits reasonably well into the current theory of oligopolistic competition. The large firms selling, say, refrigerators have products that are close to being identical. It is the job of marketing
and the production engineers to have a spice shelf full of technically known
modifications or additions that can help to differentiate the product. Costs
and demand can be reasonably estimated for such innovations. Innovation
can also fit into a modified model of a competitive market, as has been shown
by Boldrin and Levine [3]. The cost innovation discussed here can be considered in competitive markets, especially when one takes into account that
7

the appropriation by others of new ideas, industrial secrets and expertise is
by no means instantaneous.
By far the most prevalent form of innovation in most modern economies
is process innovation involving organization and frequently reducing costs of
production by orders of magnitude. New inventions call for expensive prototypes. Even if the market for the new product is clearly present, over the
first few years, especially with mass market possibilities, there is a considerable focus on unit cost reduction. The prototype is highly expensive and the
first batch for sale, though cheaper than the prototype, is usually produced
at nowhere near the intended cost. The possibility to quantify a reasonable
gaming experiment with cost innovation and to provide a reasonable scenario
appears to be far easier than trying to construct an experimental game to
illustrate radical product innovation. Here we restrict our concern to cost
reduction innovation in a competitive environment.

1.6

Some behavioral considerations

Much of the work in mathematical economics and in game theory has been
based explicitly or implicitly on an abstract homo economicus or von Neumann man. This individual has perfect recall and an ability to compute
everything. In actuality there are many different behavioral types that are
worth considering. (See [14] for a discussion.)
Here for simplicity we will restrict attention to the von Neumann player.
In a projected companion paper on an experimental game with innovation we wish to compare the human (non-experts) with the “rational” noncooperative players of our theory.

1.7

Property rights, information and appropriation
Drive for show, but putt for dough.
Old golf saying

The modeling and analysis of innovation is replete with difficulties. In
much of the mythology of purely competitive markets adjustments usually
take place immediately. In fact, in a dynamic system profits are made by
innovators having the lead ahead of the myriads of time lags in the diffusion of information and expertise. The time it takes for an industrial secret
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to leak, and the delays and barriers caused by legal, accounting and tax
considerations, are considerable.
Virtually everything is permeable at some point. Thus patent protection,
must be looked at as a time delay device and other barriers to entry as delay
devices. Law cases are often brought merely as time delay instruments.
In Crusoe’s world none of these details exist. At the level of abstraction in
the next essay, these items, often critical to any serious deal, are abstracted
away. We also will avoid the introduction of taxes and subsidies that are a
part of everyday life. In finance many of the profits lie in the taking care of
these details that arise out of equilibrium.

2

How to finance innovation

In a modern economy there are many different ways in which innovation is
financed. They depend on many empirical details concerning the nature of
the money and credit, transactions costs, knowledge, liquidity, evaluation
ability, attitude towards risk, laws, taxation and other factors. In a complex
economy such as that of the United States many different specialists may be
involved. They include inventors, their families and friends, entrepreneurs,
venture capitalists, large and small firms, bankers, and the government.
Among the many ways to finance we note five forms of financing and
analyze several. They are financing by:
(1) the owners with their own resources;
(2) the owners utilizing a capitalist or an investment banker;
(3) the firm utilizing retained earnings;
(4) the firm using a capital market;
(5) the firm borrowing from government.
In current United States practice much financing for cost innovation is either self-finance by the firm’s management and/or owners or an arrangement
between a firm and its financiers. Government may encourage innovation
and may subsidize the firms rather than be a direct investor .
In the models of Section 4 below, Crusoe is not bothered with these
institutional details. For him innovation involves physical goods and his ideas
and ability, not finance, or complex ownership and expertise conditions.

9

3

Models with cost innovation

Assume that the probability of the success of an improvement in the efficiency of production (which in a monetary economy can be interpreted as a
cost reduction) and its size can be estimated reasonably well. To be specific,
we suppose that from the initial production function f for Crusoe, a new
improved production function of the form (1 + θ)f is obtained with probability ξ(k) after a successful innovation. Here the probability ξ(k) of the
improvement is an increasing function of the resources k invested in innovation. With probability 1 − ξ(k), the innovation fails and the production
function is unchanged. For a given investment the improvement may be twodimensional, there being a trade-off between the size of the improvement and
its probability of success for a given investment. We consider the one dimensional cross section where a percentage cost improvement goal θ is given and
the function ξ(k) is the probability of success. We assume that ξ(0) = 0 so
that an investment of zero corresponds to no attempt at innovation.
In our models we assume that at the start of the game there is the opportunity for innovation. In essence the first move is a strategic decision to take
or reject a gamble to try to improve efficiency. The innovation is modeled as
a random event whose value depends on the size of investment in an attempt
to innovate .

3.1

Control of innovation

Before we can stress the role of finance in the coordination and control of
economic activity in Part 2, the models here show Crusoe in a nonfinancial
environment and then Crusoe reinterpreted as a small owner-managed firm
in a competitive economy.
Dealt with below are Robinson Crusoe
1. in a nonmonetary economy without and with risk aversion;
2. in a partial equilibrium or open monetary economy as a small ownermanager with a money and borrowing or depositing.
In Part 2 we will consider an individual
3. in a closed economy with representative agents with a fiat money and
borrowing or depositing;
10

4. in a closed economy with a many small independent owner-managers
in control of their firms.

3.2

Understanding money, prices and cash flows

Before dealing with the models noted above, some motivation is offered as
to why they are worth distinguishing and contrasting. Economics is primarily about production and the distribution of resources. Finance enters in
as part of the enabling mechanism, but while the trading of paper for paper is important in the distribution of risk, at some point the connection of
the paper with the physical economy must be made. History tells us that
the economies of the world passed through a nonmonetary stage and then
through a stage with commodity money and from there to fiat money and an
array of other financial instruments some of which are close money substitutes. A reasonable question to consider is how much does the nature of the
monetary arrangements influence prices and profits. The models presented
here serve to illustrate the distinctions.
The models of Section 4 have no money, markets or prices. They pose
pure operations research problems including that of the adjustment process
of an isolated individual. The models of Section 5 involve mass markets
and progressively more complex monetary and banking arrangements. The
unintended consequence of a more sophisticated monetary structure was to
provide government with a control mechanism over the society. The models
here are purposely as simple as we can make them in the belief that the
problems and contrasts among the different monetary mechanisms rise at
a basic level. In particular the first models call for pure economic physics;
there is production and consumption by an individual but prices, markets
and redistribution among individuals are not called for.
The models of Section 5 provide a first step toward a mass monetary
economy with a given market price and a passive government bank that is
required to set an interest rate at 1+ρ = 1/β and to lend or accept deposits at
that rate. This is essentially an open or “partial equilibrium” model without
full feedback.
In Part 2 we lead off with a model that has a representative agent in a
closed economy. Hence price is no longer constant. Another model considers
independent agents in a closed economy with varying prices.

11

4

Robinson Crusoe in a nonmonetary economy

As a preliminary to a market economy and to financial control of such an
economy, innovation by a single individual risking his resources, is considered
first.
Consider a model in which a single agent, Robinson Crusoe, produces a
good for his personal consumption. Suppose he begins with q ≥ 0 units of
the good, puts i units into production, and consumes the remaining x = q − i
thereby receiving u(q − i) in utility. The agent begins the next period with
f (i) units of the good and the game continues. (Both the utility function u
and the production function f are assumed to be concave, nondecreasing on
[0, ∞) with f (0) = 0.) The value of the game V (q) to Robinson Crusoe is
the supremum over all strategies of the payoff function
∞
X

β n−1 u(xn ),

n=1

where xn is the amount of the good consumed in period n and β ∈ (0, 1) is
a discount factor. For this model without the possibility of innovation, the
value function V satisfies the Bellman equation
V (q) = sup [u(q − i) + βV (f (i))].
0≤i≤q

Assume that there is an input i1 such that f 0 (i1 ) = 1/β. (This is certainly the
case if f 0 (0) = ∞ and limi→∞ f 0 (i) = 0, as is often assumed.) Let q1 = f (i1 ).
Theorem 1. (Karatzas et al [8]) If the initial value of the good is q1 , then
an optimal strategy is to input i1 in every period. Consequently,
V (q1 ) =

4.1

1
· u(q1 − i1 ).
1−β

Innovation by Robinson Crusoe

Assume now that our single agent with goods q is allowed to input i for
production and invest j in innovation, where 0 ≤ i ≤ q, 0 ≤ j ≤ q − i. The
agent consumes the remainder q − i − j. The innovation is successful with
probability ξ(j) resulting in an improved production function g = (1 + θ)f ,
12

where θ > 0. The innovation fails and the production function is unchanged
with probability 1 − ξ(j). Let V1 be the value function for the game with
production function f without innovation as in the previous section and let
V2 be the value function for the game with the improved production function
g. Then the value function V of the game with innovation satisfies
V (q) =

sup [u(q − i − j) + β{ξ(j)V2 (f (i)) + (1 − ξ(j))V1 (f (i))}].
0≤i≤q
0≤j≤q−i

Let ψ(i, j) be the function of i and j occuring inside the supremum. For
an interior optimum we must have the Euler equations:
∂ψ
∂ψ
=
= 0.
∂i
∂j
To find a solution to Crusoe’s innovation problem, we must calculate the
values of V1 and V2 where the quantity of goods is the amount f (i) yet to
be determined. Theorem 1 only gives an expression for the value at one
equilibrium point, which is different for the two production functions f and
g. This situation is a mathematical reflection of Schumpeter’s insight that
the circular flow must be broken.
The next two sections treat special cases where the value function can
be found for all values of q and the innovation problem can then be solved
explicitly.

4.2

A risk-neutral Crusoe

If the agent is risk-neutral, then, for the game without innovation, there is a
simple description of the optimal strategy at every value of q.
Theorem 2. Assume that u(x) = x for all x. Then an optimal strategy is
to input q if q ≤ i1 and to input i1 if q > i1 . For q ≥ i1 , the value of the
game is
β
· (q1 − i1 ).
V (q) = q − i1 +
1−β
Proof. A player with goods q > q 0 ≥ 0 can always consume q − q 0 and then
play from q 0 . Hence,
V (q) ≥ q − q 0 + V (q 0 ).
13

Consider now q ≤ i1 , and a strategy that inputs i < q. The best possible
return from such a strategy is
q − i + βV (f (i)).
But an input of q gives a best return of
βV (f (q)) ≥ β · [f (q) − f (i) + V (f (i))]
≥ β · [f 0 (q)(q − i) + V (f (i))]
≥ q − i + β · V (f (i))
since f 0 (q) ≥ f 0 (i1 ) = 1/β. So it is optimal to input q when q ≤ i1 .
Now suppose that q > i1 . Since u0 = 1, the Euler equation reduces to
0
f (i) = 1/β or i = i1 . The appropriate transversality condition is trivially
satisfied since qn = q1 for all n ≥ 1. It is easy to check that the strategy is
interior and therefore optimal
Consider next the innovation problem of the previous section for our riskneutral agent with u(x) = x.
Assume that f 0 (i1 ) = 1/β and g 0 (i2 ) = 1/β Then by Theorem 2, V10 (q) =
0
V2 (q) = 1 for q ≥ max{i1 , i2 }. Thus if f (i) ≥ max{i1 , i2 }, we have
∂ψ
(i, j) = −1 + β{ξ(j)f 0 (i) + (1 − ξ(j))f 0 (i)}
∂i
= −1 + βf 0 (i),
∂ψ
(i, j) = −1 + βξ 0 (j){V2 (f (i)) − V1 (f (i))} .
∂j
Hence, in this case, the solutions to the Euler equations are
i∗ = (f 0 )−1 (1/β) = i1 and j ∗ = (ξ 0 )−1 (1/β[V2 (f (i∗ )) − V1 (f (i∗ ))]).
To illustrate the solution, we calculate it below for a very simple example.
We will revisit essentially the same example for several other models.
4.2.1

A numerical example

√
Assume that the initial production function is f (i) = 2 i and θ =
√ .1 so
that, after a successful innovation, the production function is g = 2.2 i. Set
β = .95. Solve
f 0 (i1 ) = 1/β
and
g 0 (i2 ) = 1/β
14

to get
i1 = .9025,

i2 = 1.092

and
q1 = f (i1 ) = 1.9,

q2 = g(i2 ) = 2.299.

For q ≥ i2 > i1 , it follows from Theorem 2 that
V2 (q) − V1 (q) =

β
i1 − i2
+
(q2 − q1 ) = 3.791.
1−β
1−β

Assume now that the probability of successful innovation from investing j
is ξ(j) = j/(1 + j). As noted above, the first Euler equation has the solution
i∗ = i1 = .9025 so that f (i∗ ) = f (i1 ) = q1 = 1.9. Since 1.9 > i2 > i1 ,
V2 (f (i∗ )) − V1 (f (i∗ )) = 3.791
and the solution to the second Euler equation is j ∗ = (ξ 0 )−1 (1/(.95)(3.791)) =
.8977. Thus ξ(j ∗ ) = .8977/1.8977 = .473 is the probability that the innovation is successful.
We can use the formula from Theorem 2 to calculate
V2 (f (i∗ )) = V2 (1.9) = 23.741,
and
V1 (f (i∗ )) = V1 (1.9) = 19.95.
These values together with the values for i∗ and j ∗ can be substituted in the
formula for the value of the game with innovation to get V (q) = q + 18.86 for
q ≥ i∗ + j ∗ . The value of the game without innovation can also be calculated
as V1 (q) = q + 18.05, which shows the value of the possibility of innovation
in this instance.

4.3

A risk-averse Robinson Crusoe with proportional
production

Many of the interesting features of investment call for the consideration of
risk-averse individuals. In general, it is not possible to achieve the sort of
instant adjustment to a stationary state that can be obtained with a riskneutral Robinson Crusoe. However, analytic solutions are available when the

15

utility function has constant elasticity and production is directly proportional
to the input.
In this section we take u(x) = log x and f (i) = αi, where α is a positive
constant. (The full class of constant elasticity utilities is considered in a nice
article of Levhari and Srinivasan [10].) Thus the Bellman equation is
V (q) = sup [log(q − i) + βV (αi)].
0≤i≤q

The Euler equation for an interior solution i = i(q) takes the form
1
βα
=
.
q − i(q)
αi(q) − i(αi(q))
The solution is i(q) = βq and does not depend on α. Thus the optimal plan
is for Crusoe to input βq for production whenever he holds q units of the
good. Under this plan Crusoe’s successive positions are
q1 = q, q2 = (αβ)q, . . . , qn = (αβ)n−1 q, . . . ,
and the optimal return is
V (q) =

∞
X

β

n−1

log(qn − βqn ) =

∞
X

β n−1 log((αβ)n−1 (1 − β)q).

n=1

n=1

Using properties of the log function and geometric series, we can rewrite the
return as
V (q) =
4.3.1

log q
log(1 − β)
β
+
+
[log α + log β].
1−β
1−β
(1 − β)2

Innovation by a risk-averse Robinson Crusoe

Consider now the situation of an agent who begins with the utility u(x) =
log x and production function f (i) = αi as in the previous section, and contemplates the possibility of an innovation leading to an improved production
function g(i) = (1 + θ)αi. As in section 1.1, let V1 and V2 be the original
value function and that after a successful innovation. Then the value function V1 (q) is given by the formula of the previous section and V2 (q) is given
by the same formula with the constant α mulplied by 1 + θ. Thus
V2 (q) = V1 (q) +

β
log(1 + θ),
(1 − β)2
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and the final term above represents the value to Crusoe of having the improved production function. The value function V for the game with innovation can now be written as
V (q) = sup [log(q − i − j) + β{ξ(j)V2 (αi) + (1 − ξ(j))V1 (αi)}]
0≤i≤q
0≤j≤q−i

= sup [log(q − i − j) + β{V1 (αi) + ξ(j)
0≤i≤q
0≤j≤q−i

β
log(1 + θ)}].
(1 − β)2

The Euler equations for an interior solution i = i(q), j = j(q) can be obtained
by letting ψ(i, j) be the function inside the supremum and setting its two
partial derivatives equal to zero. Here is the result.
β 1
β2
1
=
=
log(1 + θ)ξ 0 (j).
2
q−i−j
(1 − β) i
(1 − β)
The first equation can be solved for i to get
i = β(q − j).
This expression for i can then be substuted back in to obtain
ξ 0 (j) =

1−β
1
·
.
β log(1 + θ) q − j
2

This equation can be solved explicitly if, as in Section 4.2.1, ξ(j) = j/(j + 1).
In this case, the equation above for j becomes a quadratic. Using β = .95, θ =
.1 as in Section 4.2.1. and setting q = 2, the positive root of this quadratic
equation is j ∗ = .57 and, for this value, the chance of a successful innovation
is .57/1.57 = .36

4.4

A comment on saving and assets

We have so far modeled Crusoe without durable assets. Prior to introducing
money, this is done to illustrate the simple point that without durables Crusoe’s wealth is limited by immediate production. Hence his ability to innovate
calls for his cutting back on immediate production and/or consumption. If
he is able to store durables, there is no bound to his wealth. A perfect
durable may be regarded as having a linear storage production function such
17

that xt → xt+1 . The concept of utility or end use consumption involves flows
rather than stocks. Durable assets may provide a flow of consumption or
production services over time. If Crusoe’s island contains a deserted town he
might derive little if any direct consumption value from its presence, but it
could supply assets for innovation.
In the model of the next section, Crusoe has both a durable and a nondurable asset. The consumption value of the durable asset is represented by
a parameter γ, which may be extremely small. However, the asset can be
used to increase the probability of success of the innovation.
In a modern economy the predominant form of real asset is a production
asset such as a steel plant or bank or computer center that yields no direct
consumption value. Furthermore consumer assets such as houses, automobiles and appliances yield a stream of daily services that are relatively small
in comparison with their asset value in a multistage dynamic economy.

4.5

Crusoe innovates using a long term asset

Suppose that in addition to his holdings of q units of a nondurable good,
Crusoe also has r units of a durable good that yield a utility of γr in each
period, where γ is a positive constant.
If only the nondurable good is used for production then his optimal reward
V1 (q, r) will satisfy
V1 (q, r) =

sup [u(q − i) + γr + βV1 (f (i), r)]
0≤i≤q

= V1 (q) +

γr
.
1−β

Here V1 (q) is the value of the previous sections in which Crusoe held only
one good and had production function f .
Likewise if Crusoe has production function g(i) = (1 + θ)f (i), then his
optimal reward is
γr
V2 (q, r) = V2 (q) +
,
1−β
where V2 (q) is the corresponding value when he holds only q.
Now assume that Crusoe can invest any quantity j ∈ [0, r] of the durable
good in an attempt at innovation. As in section 4.1 the investment of j
is successful with the probability ξ(j) resulting in the improved production
function g(i) = (1 + θ)f (i). With probability 1 − ξ(j) the innovation fails
18

and the production function is unchanged. The optimal reward will take the
form
V (q, r) = sup [u(q−i)+γ(r−j)+β{ξ(j)V2 (f (i), r−j)+(1−ξ(j))V1 (f (i), r−j)}].
0≤i≤q
0≤j≤r

Let ψ(i, j) denote the expression occuring inside the supremum. It can be
rewritten as
ψ(i, j) = u(q − i) +

γ(r − j)
+ β{ξ(j)[V2 (f (i)) − V1 (f (i))] + V1 (f (i))}.
1−β

4.5.1

The numerical example with a long-term asset
√
As in the example of Section 4.2.1, let u(x) = x, f (i) = 2 i, θ = .1, β = .95
and ξ(j) = j/(j + 1). Also set γ = .1. It follows from the calculation in
Section 4.2.1 that, for q, f (i) and r sufficiently large, that
√
ψ(i, j) = q − i + 2(r − j) + .95{ξ(j)(3.791) + V1 (2 i)}.
Setting
∂ψ
∂ψ
=
= 0,
∂i
∂j
we find that the optimal values are
i∗ = i1 = .9025,

j ∗ = (ξ 0−1 (2/(.95)(3.791)) = .34

with the success probability ξ(.34) = .34/1.34 = .25.

5

Crusoe as a single small firm in a large
economy

We model Crusoe’s entry into the market in two ways. In the first model,
he is a utility maximizing owner-manager of a small firm. In the second, he
acts as a profit maximizing small firm.
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5.1

Crusoe as a utility maximizing owner of a small
firm

Suppose Crusoe owns a small firm operating in a large market for a nondurable consumption good. At the start of each period Crusoe holds a nonnegative amount of cash m and goods q. The goods are sold in the market
at a fixed price p > 0. Crusoe also bids an amount b in the market to purchase an amount b/p of goods that can be either consumed or used as input
for production. Some portion of the goods purchased can also be invested
in innovation. In the monetary economy Crusoe can buy the desired goods
rather than have them in inventory.
Crusoe can also obtain loans or make deposits in a bank that charges and
pays an interest rate ρ > 0. For simplicity we assume deposit and loan rates
are the same. Crusoe’s limit for a one period loan is given by his expected
discounted cash earnings which are pq/(1 + ρ). It is a commercial loan that
finances circulating capital. Crusoe can spend in the market any of the cash
he holds together with what he can borrow. Thus his bid b must belong to
the interval [0, m + pq/(1 + ρ)]
After choosing b, Crusoe selects an amount of goods i to put into production and consumes the remaining b/p − i. He begins the next period with
cash m̃ = (1 + ρ)(m − b) + pq and goods for sale q̃ = f (i).
Given a utility function u for consumption, the value V1 (m, q) is given by


b
− i + βV1 ((1 + ρ)(m − b) + pq, f (i))].
V1 (m, q) =
sup
[u
p
0≤b≤m+pq/(1+ρ)
0≤i≤b/p

At an interior optimum, the actions b and i will satisfy the Euler equations:
b
b̃
u0 ( − i) = β(1 + ρ)u0 ( − ı̃)
p
p
1
b̃
b
u0 ( − i) = βf 0 (i)
u0 ( − ı̃)
p
1+ρ p
Here b̃ and ı̃ are the optimal actions at the next stage. It follows that the
optimal input i must satisfy f 0 (i) = (1 + ρ)2 for any utility function u with
a strictly positive derivative.
Consider next the possibility that Crusoe devotes some quantity j of the
b/p units of the good to innovation that with probability ξ(j) results in an
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improved production function g(i) = (1 + θ)f (i). Let V2 (m, q) be the value
function corresponding to the production function g Then the value function
V (m, q) for the game with the possibility of innovation is given by
sup

[u(b/p − i − j) + β{ξ(j)V2 (m̃, f (i)) + (1 − ξ(j))V1 (m̃, f (i))}],

0≤b≤m+pq/(1+ρ)
0≤i≤b/p
0≤j≤b/p−i

where m̃ = (1 + ρ)(m − b) + pq is Crusoe’s cash at the beginning of the next
period.
5.1.1

A simple example for the utility maximizing owner
√
Assume u(x) = x, f (i) = 2 i, θ = .1 and β = .95 as in previous examples.
Furthermore set p = 1 and 1 + ρ = 1/β.
The Euler equations are satisfied for i = i1 = (f 0 )−1 ((1 + ρ)2 ) = .81 and
any allowed value for b. One optimal strategy is to always bid the maximum
so that the inital bid is m + q/(1 + ρ) and the bid is q1 /(1 + ρ) at every later
stage, where q1 = f (i1 ) = 1.805. Thus, for m + q/(1 + ρ) ≥ i1 ,
β
q1
q
− i1 +
·(
− i1 )
1+ρ
1−β 1+ρ
=m + .95q + 16.38.

V1 (m, q) =m +

Similarly, for i2 = (g 0 )−1 ((1 + ρ)2 ) = .9855, q2 = g(i2 ) = 2.184, and m +
q/(1 + ρ) ≥ i2 ,
β
q2
q
− i2 +
·(
− i2 )
1+ρ
1−β 1+ρ
=m + .95q + 19.71.

V2 (m, q) =m +

Now let V (m, q) be the value of the innovation game as defined at the end of
the previous section, and let ψ(b, i, j) be the function inside the supremum
in the formula for V (m, q). For our simple example, we have
ψ(b, i, j) =b − i − j + β · {ξ(j)V2 (m̃, f (i)) + (1 − ξ(j))V1 (m̃, f (i))}
=b − i − j + (.95){ξ(j) · (19.71 − 16.38) + V1 (m̃, f (i))},
for m + q/(1 + ρ) sufficiently large. Since ψ is increasing in b, the optimal
value is its maximum, namely b∗ = m + (.95)q. Also,
∂ψ
∂V1
= −1 + (.95)f 0 (i) ·
= −1 + (.95)2 f 0 (i).
∂i
∂q
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So the optimal value is i∗ = i1 = (f 0−1 (1/(.95)2 ) = .81. Finally,
∂ψ
= −1 + (.95)(3.37)ξ 0 (j).
∂j
If ξ(j) = j/(j +1), then this partial derivative is zero for j = .79. The chance
of a successful innovation for this optimal value of j is ξ(.79) = .79/1.79 =
.44.

5.2

Crusoe as a profit maximizing firm

Consider now Crusoe as a small firm in a large economy. In each period the
firm holds goods q ≥ 0 which are to be sold in a market for cash at a fixed
price p > 0. The firm also bids cash in the market to buy goods as input for
production. The firm holds no cash, but can borrow from a bank at interest
rate ρ ≥ 0. The bound on the firm’s loan is the amount pq/(1 + ρ), which is
the most that the firm can pay back with interest at the end of the period.
Thus the firm borrows and bids an amount b ∈ [0, pq/(1 + ρ)] to purchase
goods i = b/p as input for production. The profit π of the firm in the period
is its income less what it must pay back to the bank, namely
π = pq − (1 + ρ)b.
The profit is paid in each period to the firm’s owners, and the firm begins
the next period with goods q̃ = f (i).
The object of the firm is to maximize its total discounted profit given by
∞
X
1
· πn,
(1 + ρ)n−1
n=1
where π n is the profit in the nth period. The firm has the Bellman equation:
1
V (q) =
sup
[pq − (1 + ρ)b +
V (f (b/p))].
(1 + ρ)
0≤b≤pq/(1+ρ)
Assume that there is an input i3 such that f 0 (i3 ) = (1 + ρ)2 , and let
q3 = f (i3 ). The following theorem is analogous to Theorem 2 as is its proof.
Theorem 3. An optimal strategy for the firm is to make the maximum bid
pq/(1 + ρ) if q/(1 + ρ) < i3 and to bid b∗ = pi3 if i3 ≤ q/(1 + ρ). In the latter
case, the value of the game is
1
V (q) = pq − b∗ (1 + ρ) + (pq3 − b∗ (1 + ρ)).
ρ
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Notice that when 1 + ρ = 1/β, the factor 1/ρ in the formula of Theorem
3 corresponds to the factor β/(1 − β) in Theorem 2. However,
i3 = (f 0 )−1 ((1 + ρ)2 ) = (f 0 )−1 (1/β 2 ),
whereas in Theorem 2, i1 = (f 0 )−1 (1/β). The reason for this difference in
inputs is that Robinson Crusoe is able to consume the production from his
input in the next period, but the firm must wait an additional period to
realize the profit from its input.
5.2.1

Innovation by Crusoe’s firm

Suppose now that, in the first period, the firm bids b + c ∈ [0, pq/(1 + ρ)]
to purchase goods (b + c)/p, inputs b/p for production and invests c/p in
innovation. If the innovation succeeds, the firm will then have the improved
production function g = (1 + θ)f to use in future periods. Let V1 be the
firm’s value function for the original production function f and let V2 be the
value function corresponding to g. If ξ(c/p) is the probability of a successful
innovation, then the value function V (q) of the game with innovation satisfies
the Bellman equation:
V (q) =

sup

ψ(b, c),

0≤b+c≤pq/(1+ρ)
b≥0,c≥0

where
ψ(b, c) = pq−(b+c)(1+ρ)+

1
{ξ(c/p)V2 (f (b/p))+(1−ξ(c/p))V1 (f (b/p))}
1+ρ

At an interior maximum,
∂ψ
∂ψ
=
= 0.
∂b
∂c
Suppose that f 0 (i3 ) = (1 + ρ)2 = g 0 (i4 ). If f (b/p)/(1 + ρ) ≥ max{i3 , i4 }, then,
by Theorem 3,
∂ψ
1
= −(1 + ρ) +
f 0 (b/p)
∂b
1+ρ
and
∂ψ
1
1
= −(1 + ρ) +
· · ξ 0 (c/p)[V2 (f (b/p)) − V1 (f (b/p))].
∂c
1+ρ p
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It follows that, for an interior maximum, we must have
b∗ /p = i∗ = i3 = (f 0 )−1 ((1 + ρ)2 )
and
∗

0 −1

∗

c /p = j = (ξ )




p(1 + ρ)2
.
V2 (f (i∗ )) − V1 (f (i∗ ))

5.2.2

A simple example for the firm
√
Assume as in Section 5.1.1 that f (i) = 2 i, θ = .1, p = 1, 1 + ρ = 1/(.95)
and ξ(j) = j/(j + 1). Then
b∗ = i∗ = i3 = (f 0 )−1 (1/(.95)2 ) = .81
and
q3 = f (i3 ) = 1.8.
Also, set
i4 = (g 0 )−1 (1/(.95)2 ) = .99,

q4 = g(i4 ) = 2.19.

Now use Theorem 3 to calculate
V1 (f (i∗ )) = V1 (1.8) = 1.8 − (.81)/(.95) + 19(1.8 − (.81)/(.95)) = 18.95,
V2 (f (i∗ )) = V2 (1.8) = 1.8 − (.99)/(.95) + 19(2.19 − (.99)/(.95)) = 22.57.
Hence,
∗

0 −1

j = (ξ )



1/(.95)2
22.57 − 18.95


= .81,

and ξ(j ∗ ) = .81/(1.81) = .45. Thus the firm’s chance of a successful innovation is about the same as that of the risk-neutral utility maximizer in Section
5.1.1. This is not surprising since the firm’s utility is also linear.

5.3

The firm’s innovation financed by long-term loans

As in the previous section, Crusoe here plays the role of a profit maximizing
small firm. As before the firm holds goods q and can obtain short-term loans
from a central bank at interest rate ρ to finance production in each period.
However, the firm’s investment in innovation is now financed by a long-term
loan from an investment bank that sets an upper bound D ≥ 0 on such loans.
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If the firm borrows an amount d ∈ [0, D] from the investment bank, then it
is required to pay back ρd in every period. Such a loan is sometimes called
a perpetuity.
In any period after the first, Crusoe will begin with an amount of goods
q ≥ 0 and long-term debt d ≥ 0. Since he is obligated to pay the investment
bank ρd is each period, the central bank now sets the limit on his short-term
loans at pq/(1 + ρ) − ρd (or zero if this bound is negative). Crusoe’s value
function now becomes
V1 (q, d) =

[pq − (1 + ρ)b − ρd +

sup
0≤b≤pq/(1+ρ)−ρd

1
V1 (f (b/p), d)],
1+ρ

when the production function is f .
Let i3 be an input such that f 0 (i3 ) = (1 + ρ)2 as in Section 5.2. If
pi3 ≤ pq/(1 + ρ) − ρd, then the optimal action for the firm is b = pi3 as in
Theorem 3. Indeed, the only difference from the problem faced by the firm
in Section 5.2 is the payment of ρd in every period for a total discounted cost
of
ρd
ρd
ρd +
+
+ · · · = d(1 + ρ).
1 + ρ (1 + ρ)2
Hence,
V1 (q, d) = V1 (q) − d(1 + ρ),
where V1 (q) is the value of the game in 5.2.
Next let V2 (q, d) be the value when the firm has production function
g = (1 + θ)f and starts with goods q and long-term debt d. If i4 is an input
such that g(i4 ) = (1 + ρ)2 and pi4 ≤ pq/(1 + ρ) − ρd, then
V2 (q, d) = V2 (q) − d(1 + ρ),
where again V2 (q) is the value for the game of Section 5.2 with production
function g.
Suppose now that Crusoe begins with goods q > 0 and considers the
possibility of financing innovation by a long-term loan. His value function
V (q) is then the supremum over b and d such that 0 ≤ d ≤ D and 0 ≤ b ≤
pq/(1 + ρ) − ρd of the expression
pq − (1 + ρ)b − ρd +

1
{ξ(d/p)V2 (f (b/p), d) + (1 − ξ(d/p))V1 (f (b/p), d)}
1+ρ
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or equivalently
pq − (1 + ρ)(b + d) +

1
{ξ(d/p)V2 (f (b/p)) + (1 − ξ(d/p))V1 (f (b/p))}.
1+ρ

This is the same algebraic expression, with d in place of c, that we had for
the value V (q) in Section 5.2.1. So an interior solution to the short-term
problem in Section 5.2.1 will also be a solution to the long-term financing
problem. However, since Crusoe’s daily payments of ρd for the long-term
loan are smaller than the one payment of (1 + ρ)d for the short-term loan, it
may happen that the long-term loan is feasible when the short-term loan is
not.

6

Ownership and control in a monetary economy

6.1

Three levels of modeling

There are several levels for the modeling of competitors. In this first essay
we deal only with the first one.
1. The nonatomic agent
The first model has a minute or non-atomic individual agent manufacturerconsumer approach, and is strategically just a step up from Robinson
Crusoe. This has an insignificantly sized owner run firm embedded in
large markets. In essence there is no market feedback, it can be considered as a partial equilibrium or open model and one need not worry
about conservation.
The next two are covered at the start of Part 2.
2. The representative agent
The second has a representative agent who is a price-taker like the
nonatomic agents glued together, and the full macroeconomic feedback
from the closed economy is considered.
3. The full measure of independent agents
The third model deals with a closed economy with full feed back from
a multitude of independent agents.
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The representative agent and full measure of independent agents appear
to be the same when there is no exogenous uncertainty present, but the basic
differences become clear as soon as uncertainty is introduced.

6.2

Innovation and the role of credit

When dealing with innovation, either the money or the credit supply or both
must be flexible. In the event of default the rules of destruction of credit
and of money differ. This difference is of relevance in understanding the
relationship between a central bank and the commercial banking system.
This point is taken up in Part 2.

6.3

Innovation over many periods

In all of the models analyzed above the basic theme has been that of a
single individual, first in an isolated non-monetary world and then in a large
monetary world . Our concern has been with his decision to innovate. We
have however limited the analysis to a single decision. We close with one
more model where the individual may have the opportunity to try several
times until either she succeeds or her credit runs out
6.3.1

Repeated attempts at innovation by a firm

The model with repeated attempts at innovation until sucess is a direct
extension of the model in 5.2.1. The only difference is that, after a failed
attempt at innovation the firm is free to try again. The Bellman equation
for the value function V (q) will be the same as in 5.2.1 except that in the
expression for the function ψ(b, c), V1 (f (b/p)) must be replaced by V (f (b/p)).
The reason is that after a failed attempt, the firm faces the same problem
again but with the quantity of goods q replaced by f (b/p). For large enough
values of q the optimal initial bid b∗ = pi∗ is the same as in 5.2.1, and the
expression for the optimal c∗ is also the same except that V1 (f (i∗ )) must be
replaced by V (f (i∗ )). However, we do not have an analytic expression for V
comparable to that of Theorem 3. So the calculation of c∗ seems to be more
difficult. If f (i∗ ) is sufficiently large so that the bids b∗ and c∗ are feasible
(i.e. b∗ + c∗ ≤ pf (i∗ )/(1 + ρ)), then the optimal policy will be to continue to
make these bids until the innovation attempt is successful. Of course, success
will occur eventually with probability one if ξ(c∗ /p) > 0.
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A somewhat more complicated but economically reasonable model would
include the possibility that a successful innovator would continue to try for
a subsequent innovation. This opens up problems with increasing returns to
scale ( cf. [1]) that we do not deal with in this essay although the model
would be highly related to the one above.

6.4

Innovation and the emerging financial structure

From a view point of the economics the models have been quite simple;
but in our layering on the complexities starting with the first non-monetary
individualistic models where ownership and control are clearly unified we are
able to trace the needs for the emergence of various financial instruments and
their role and to contrast them with their counterparts, if any in an autarchic
nonmonetary world. The specific observations are noted below:
1. The availability of durable assets is critical for Crusoe, but for the small
individual in a large economy with many assets for sale, money is in
general the surrogate for all marketable assets.
2. The problem of the separation between ownership and control does
not appear in Crusoe’s world. It arises in a multiperson economy that
distinguishes real persons from corporate persons
3. Short term loans in our models are, in essence, commercial loans for
circulating capital, or “bills” with essentially no risk attached to them
that are repaid immediately after “goods-in-process” have been produced and sold. The constraints on how large they should be are made
under the assumption that the bank can forecast accurately in the very
short term.
4. Long term loans are qualitatively different from short term loans and
are called for even when we assume no exogenous uncertainty and the
dynamics promises a stream of profits sufficient to repay the loan with
interest, but with cash flows that are insufficient to repay the loan in
a single period.
5. The evaluation of the credit worthiness of an innovator who wishes to
borrow beyond the liquidation value of his assets is virtually an art
form for the venture capitalist. This is why the parameter “D́” in the
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model of Section 5.3 has no formula attached to it. In the model with
repeated attempts of 6.3.1, an innovator who fails can only try again if
his credit line now shrunk to D-d is large enough. In fact after the first
failure there would be a readjustment of D based on the old banking
adage of Character, Competence and Collateral.
6. As soon as there are two different types of loans, seniority questions
must be specified. They are implicitly present in our models in the need
for default conditions that we have not specified. We would get away
without having to specify them when examining equilibrium conditions
that are default free whereas the dynamics of these models could easily
involve default. At the expense of several more constraints they can be
made explicit in our models.
7. In general in the transformation from the self-sufficient Crusoe, the
financial system of a monetary economy is the control and perception
mechanism of a multi-person economy. The roles of finance both in
perception and control must be accounted for. In the mathematics the
constraints reflect the control; but for the most part the evaluation of
the constraints lie out of the model depending on how risk assessment
and due diligence is performed.
8. The last point concerns the financiers themselves. In this essay we have
concentrated on Crusoe and the firm. The resource bounds in Crusoe’s
economy of Section 4 were physical involving real assets. The resource
bounds on the monetary economy of Section 5 involve the availability
of real assets and money. Hence the creation and destruction of outside
money, which is a virtual real asset, by the government or banks plays
a role that has not been covered in this essay.
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